1.

In the passage, the author is primarily concerned with doing which one of the following?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

2.

It can be inferred from the passage that the author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following assertions regarding the “general principles of law” mentioned in lines 16-17 of the passage?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

3.

The author implies that which one of the following is true of economic development agreements?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

4.

According to the author, which one of the following is true of a contract that is designated by a French government agency as an administrative contract?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

5.

It can be inferred from the passage that under the “ordinary law of contracts” (lines 53-54), a government would have the right to modify unilaterally the terms of a contract that it had entered into with a foreign investor if which one of the following were true?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

6.

In the last paragraph, the author refers to government contracts in the United States and the United Kingdom primarily in order to

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

7.

Which one of the following best states the author’s main conclusion in the passage?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

8.

The author’s argument in lines 57-62 would be most weakened if which one of the following were true?

Governments of developing countries
occasionally enter into economic development
agreements with foreign investors who provide
capital and technological expertise that may not be
(5) readily available in such countries. Besides the
normal economic risk that accompanies such
enterprises, investors face the additional risk that
the host government may attempt unilaterally to
change in its favor the terms of the agreement or
(10) even to terminate the agreement altogether and
appropriate the project for itself. In order to make
economic development agreements more attractive
to investors, some developing countries have
attempted to strengthen the security of such
(15) agreements with clauses specifying that the
agreements will be governed by “general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations”—a set of
legal principles or rules shared by the world’s major
legal systems. However, advocates of governments’
(20) freedom to modify or terminate such agreements
argue that these agreements fall within a special
class of contracts known as administrative contracts,
a concept that originated in French law. They assert
that under the theory of administrative contracts, a
(25) government retains inherent power to modify or
terminate its own contract, and that this power
indeed constitutes a general principle of law.
However, their argument is flawed on at least two
counts.

(30) First, in French law not all government contracts
are treated as administrative contracts. Some
contracts are designated as administrative by
specific statute, in which case the contractor is
made aware of the applicable legal rules upon
(35) entering into agreement with the government.
Alternatively, the contracting government agency
can itself designate a contract as administrative by
including certain terms not found in private civil
contracts. Moreover, even in the case of
(40) administrative contracts, French law requires that
in the event that the government unilaterally
modifies the terms of the contract, it must
compensate the contractor for any increased
burden resulting from the government’s action. In
(45) effect, the government is thus prevented from
modifying those contractual terms that define the
financial balance of the contract.

Second, the French law of administrative
contracts, although adopted by several countries, is
(50) not so universally accepted that it can be embraced
as a general principle of law. In both the United
States and the United Kingdom, government
contracts are governed by the ordinary law of
contracts, with the result that the government can
(55) reserve the power to modify or terminate a contract
unilaterally only by writing such power into the
contract as a specific provision. Indeed, the very fact
that termination and modification clauses are
commonly found in government contracts suggests
(60) that a government’s capacity to modify or terminate
agreements unilaterally derives from specific contract
provisions, not from inherent state power.

9.

Which one of the following best states the central idea of the passage?

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

10.

According to the passage, Frijda’s law asserts that emotional responses to events are

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

11.

The author suggests that Frijda’s notion of the role of imagination in aesthetic response is problematic because it

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

12.

The passage supports all of the following statements about the differences between Gombrich and Radford EXCEPT:

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

13.

Which one of the following best captures the progression of the author’s argument in lines 9-31?

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

14.

The author’s assertions concerning movies about ghosts imply that all of the following statements are false EXCEPT:

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

15.

Which one of the following statements best exemplifies the position of Radford concerning the nature of emotional response to art?

Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by
a psychological principle called the “law of
apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by
events appraised as real, and the intensity of these
(5) emotions corresponds to the degree to which these
events are appraised as real. This observation seems
psychologically plausible, but emotional responses
elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.

Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid
(10) of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a
rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I
see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be
a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie
and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I
(15) might experience the same emotions of panic and
distress, though I know the snake is not real. These
responses extend even to phenomena not
conventionally accepted as real. A movie about
ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers,
(20) even those who firmly reject the possibility of
ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing
cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can
feel strong emotions in response to objects of art
that are interpretations, rather than
(25) representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s
Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral.
However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional
reactions, there should be no emotional response at
all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know
(30) they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is
real.

Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings
they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic
experience, have claimed that these emotions are
(35) genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic
emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction
rather than an empirical observation and
consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other
hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to
(40) art are ersatz: art triggers remembrances of
previously experienced emotions. These debates
have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue
that people do experience real melancholy or joy in
responding to art, but that these are irrational
(45) responses precisely because people know they are
reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not
help us to untangle these positions, since it simply
implies that events we recognize as being
represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion
(50) in the first place.

Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has
“properties of reality”—implying, without
explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or
events “real” in the act of experiencing them.
(55) However, as Scruton argues, a necessary
characteristic of the imaginative construction that
can occur in an emotional response to art is that the
person knows he or she is pretending. This is what
distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.

16.

It can be inferred from the passage that which one of the following experimental results would suggest that bacteria detect changes in the concentration of an attractant by measuring its concentration in front and back of the cell body simultaneously?

Although bacteria are unicellular and among the
simplest autonomous forms of life, they show a
remarkable ability to sense their environment. They
are attracted to materials they need and are
(5) repelled by harmful substances. Most types of
bacteria swim very erratically; short smooth runs in
relatively straight lines are followed by brief
tumbles, after which the bacteria shoot off in
random directions. This leaves researchers with the
(10) question of how such bacteria find their way to an
attractant such as food or, in the case of
photosynthetic bacteria, light, if their swimming
pattern consists only of smooth runs and tumbles,
the latter resulting in random changes in direction.

(15) One clue comes from the observation that when
a chemical attractant is added to a suspension of
such bacteria, the bacteria swim along a gradient of
the attractant, from an area where the
concentration of the attractant is weaker to an area
(20) where it is stronger. As they do so, their swimming
is characterized by a decrease in tumbling and an
increase in straight runs over relatively longer
distances. As the bacteria encounter increasing
concentrations of the attractant, their tendency to
(25) tumble is suppressed, whereas tumbling increases
whenever they move away from the attractant. The
net effect is that runs in the direction of higher
concentrations of the attractant become longer and
straighter as a result of the suppression of tumbling,
(30) whereas runs away from it are shortened by an
increased tendency of the bacteria to tumble and
change direction.

Biologists have proposed two mechanisms that
bacteria might use in detecting changes in the
(35) concentration of a chemical attractant. First, a
bacterium might compare the concentration of a
chemical at the front and back of its cell body
simultaneously. If the concentration is higher at the
front of the cell, then it knows it is moving up the
(40) concentration gradient, from an area where the
concentration is lower to an area where it is higher.
Alternatively, it might measure the concentration at
one instant and again after a brief interval, in which
case the bacterium must retain a memory of the
(45) initial concentration. Researchers reasoned that if
bacteria do compare concentrations at different
times, then when suddenly exposed to a uniformly
high concentration of an attractant, the cells would
behave as if they were swimming up a concentration
(50) gradient, with long, smooth runs and relatively few
tumbles. If, on the other hand, bacteria detect a
chemical gradient by measuring it simultaneously at
two distinct points, front and back, on the cell body,
they would not respond to the jump in
(55) concentration because the concentration of the
attractant in front and back of the cells, though
high, would be uniform. Experimental evidence
suggests that bacteria compare concentrations at
different times.

17.

It can be inferred from the passage that a bacterium would increase the likelihood of its moving away from an area where the concentration of a harmful substance is high if it did which one of the following?

Although bacteria are unicellular and among the
simplest autonomous forms of life, they show a
remarkable ability to sense their environment. They
are attracted to materials they need and are
(5) repelled by harmful substances. Most types of
bacteria swim very erratically; short smooth runs in
relatively straight lines are followed by brief
tumbles, after which the bacteria shoot off in
random directions. This leaves researchers with the
(10) question of how such bacteria find their way to an
attractant such as food or, in the case of
photosynthetic bacteria, light, if their swimming
pattern consists only of smooth runs and tumbles,
the latter resulting in random changes in direction.

(15) One clue comes from the observation that when
a chemical attractant is added to a suspension of
such bacteria, the bacteria swim along a gradient of
the attractant, from an area where the
concentration of the attractant is weaker to an area
(20) where it is stronger. As they do so, their swimming
is characterized by a decrease in tumbling and an
increase in straight runs over relatively longer
distances. As the bacteria encounter increasing
concentrations of the attractant, their tendency to
(25) tumble is suppressed, whereas tumbling increases
whenever they move away from the attractant. The
net effect is that runs in the direction of higher
concentrations of the attractant become longer and
straighter as a result of the suppression of tumbling,
(30) whereas runs away from it are shortened by an
increased tendency of the bacteria to tumble and
change direction.

Biologists have proposed two mechanisms that
bacteria might use in detecting changes in the
(35) concentration of a chemical attractant. First, a
bacterium might compare the concentration of a
chemical at the front and back of its cell body
simultaneously. If the concentration is higher at the
front of the cell, then it knows it is moving up the
(40) concentration gradient, from an area where the
concentration is lower to an area where it is higher.
Alternatively, it might measure the concentration at
one instant and again after a brief interval, in which
case the bacterium must retain a memory of the
(45) initial concentration. Researchers reasoned that if
bacteria do compare concentrations at different
times, then when suddenly exposed to a uniformly
high concentration of an attractant, the cells would
behave as if they were swimming up a concentration
(50) gradient, with long, smooth runs and relatively few
tumbles. If, on the other hand, bacteria detect a
chemical gradient by measuring it simultaneously at
two distinct points, front and back, on the cell body,
they would not respond to the jump in
(55) concentration because the concentration of the
attractant in front and back of the cells, though
high, would be uniform. Experimental evidence
suggests that bacteria compare concentrations at
different times.

18.

It can be inferred from the passage that when describing bacteria as “swimming up a concentration gradient” (lines 49-50), the author means that they were behaving as if they were swimming

Although bacteria are unicellular and among the
simplest autonomous forms of life, they show a
remarkable ability to sense their environment. They
are attracted to materials they need and are
(5) repelled by harmful substances. Most types of
bacteria swim very erratically; short smooth runs in
relatively straight lines are followed by brief
tumbles, after which the bacteria shoot off in
random directions. This leaves researchers with the
(10) question of how such bacteria find their way to an
attractant such as food or, in the case of
photosynthetic bacteria, light, if their swimming
pattern consists only of smooth runs and tumbles,
the latter resulting in random changes in direction.

(15) One clue comes from the observation that when
a chemical attractant is added to a suspension of
such bacteria, the bacteria swim along a gradient of
the attractant, from an area where the
concentration of the attractant is weaker to an area
(20) where it is stronger. As they do so, their swimming
is characterized by a decrease in tumbling and an
increase in straight runs over relatively longer
distances. As the bacteria encounter increasing
concentrations of the attractant, their tendency to
(25) tumble is suppressed, whereas tumbling increases
whenever they move away from the attractant. The
net effect is that runs in the direction of higher
concentrations of the attractant become longer and
straighter as a result of the suppression of tumbling,
(30) whereas runs away from it are shortened by an
increased tendency of the bacteria to tumble and
change direction.

Biologists have proposed two mechanisms that
bacteria might use in detecting changes in the
(35) concentration of a chemical attractant. First, a
bacterium might compare the concentration of a
chemical at the front and back of its cell body
simultaneously. If the concentration is higher at the
front of the cell, then it knows it is moving up the
(40) concentration gradient, from an area where the
concentration is lower to an area where it is higher.
Alternatively, it might measure the concentration at
one instant and again after a brief interval, in which
case the bacterium must retain a memory of the
(45) initial concentration. Researchers reasoned that if
bacteria do compare concentrations at different
times, then when suddenly exposed to a uniformly
high concentration of an attractant, the cells would
behave as if they were swimming up a concentration
(50) gradient, with long, smooth runs and relatively few
tumbles. If, on the other hand, bacteria detect a
chemical gradient by measuring it simultaneously at
two distinct points, front and back, on the cell body,
they would not respond to the jump in
(55) concentration because the concentration of the
attractant in front and back of the cells, though
high, would be uniform. Experimental evidence
suggests that bacteria compare concentrations at
different times.

19.

The passage indicates that the pattern that characterizes a bacterium’s motion changes in response to

Although bacteria are unicellular and among the
simplest autonomous forms of life, they show a
remarkable ability to sense their environment. They
are attracted to materials they need and are
(5) repelled by harmful substances. Most types of
bacteria swim very erratically; short smooth runs in
relatively straight lines are followed by brief
tumbles, after which the bacteria shoot off in
random directions. This leaves researchers with the
(10) question of how such bacteria find their way to an
attractant such as food or, in the case of
photosynthetic bacteria, light, if their swimming
pattern consists only of smooth runs and tumbles,
the latter resulting in random changes in direction.

(15) One clue comes from the observation that when
a chemical attractant is added to a suspension of
such bacteria, the bacteria swim along a gradient of
the attractant, from an area where the
concentration of the attractant is weaker to an area
(20) where it is stronger. As they do so, their swimming
is characterized by a decrease in tumbling and an
increase in straight runs over relatively longer
distances. As the bacteria encounter increasing
concentrations of the attractant, their tendency to
(25) tumble is suppressed, whereas tumbling increases
whenever they move away from the attractant. The
net effect is that runs in the direction of higher
concentrations of the attractant become longer and
straighter as a result of the suppression of tumbling,
(30) whereas runs away from it are shortened by an
increased tendency of the bacteria to tumble and
change direction.

Biologists have proposed two mechanisms that
bacteria might use in detecting changes in the
(35) concentration of a chemical attractant. First, a
bacterium might compare the concentration of a
chemical at the front and back of its cell body
simultaneously. If the concentration is higher at the
front of the cell, then it knows it is moving up the
(40) concentration gradient, from an area where the
concentration is lower to an area where it is higher.
Alternatively, it might measure the concentration at
one instant and again after a brief interval, in which
case the bacterium must retain a memory of the
(45) initial concentration. Researchers reasoned that if
bacteria do compare concentrations at different
times, then when suddenly exposed to a uniformly
high concentration of an attractant, the cells would
behave as if they were swimming up a concentration
(50) gradient, with long, smooth runs and relatively few
tumbles. If, on the other hand, bacteria detect a
chemical gradient by measuring it simultaneously at
two distinct points, front and back, on the cell body,
they would not respond to the jump in
(55) concentration because the concentration of the
attractant in front and back of the cells, though
high, would be uniform. Experimental evidence
suggests that bacteria compare concentrations at
different times.

20.

Which one of the following best describes the organization of the third paragraph of the passage?

Although bacteria are unicellular and among the
simplest autonomous forms of life, they show a
remarkable ability to sense their environment. They
are attracted to materials they need and are
(5) repelled by harmful substances. Most types of
bacteria swim very erratically; short smooth runs in
relatively straight lines are followed by brief
tumbles, after which the bacteria shoot off in
random directions. This leaves researchers with the
(10) question of how such bacteria find their way to an
attractant such as food or, in the case of
photosynthetic bacteria, light, if their swimming
pattern consists only of smooth runs and tumbles,
the latter resulting in random changes in direction.

(15) One clue comes from the observation that when
a chemical attractant is added to a suspension of
such bacteria, the bacteria swim along a gradient of
the attractant, from an area where the
concentration of the attractant is weaker to an area
(20) where it is stronger. As they do so, their swimming
is characterized by a decrease in tumbling and an
increase in straight runs over relatively longer
distances. As the bacteria encounter increasing
concentrations of the attractant, their tendency to
(25) tumble is suppressed, whereas tumbling increases
whenever they move away from the attractant. The
net effect is that runs in the direction of higher
concentrations of the attractant become longer and
straighter as a result of the suppression of tumbling,
(30) whereas runs away from it are shortened by an
increased tendency of the bacteria to tumble and
change direction.

Biologists have proposed two mechanisms that
bacteria might use in detecting changes in the
(35) concentration of a chemical attractant. First, a
bacterium might compare the concentration of a
chemical at the front and back of its cell body
simultaneously. If the concentration is higher at the
front of the cell, then it knows it is moving up the
(40) concentration gradient, from an area where the
concentration is lower to an area where it is higher.
Alternatively, it might measure the concentration at
one instant and again after a brief interval, in which
case the bacterium must retain a memory of the
(45) initial concentration. Researchers reasoned that if
bacteria do compare concentrations at different
times, then when suddenly exposed to a uniformly
high concentration of an attractant, the cells would
behave as if they were swimming up a concentration
(50) gradient, with long, smooth runs and relatively few
tumbles. If, on the other hand, bacteria detect a
chemical gradient by measuring it simultaneously at
two distinct points, front and back, on the cell body,
they would not respond to the jump in
(55) concentration because the concentration of the
attractant in front and back of the cells, though
high, would be uniform. Experimental evidence
suggests that bacteria compare concentrations at
different times.

21.

The passage provides information in support of which one of the following assertions?

Although bacteria are unicellular and among the
simplest autonomous forms of life, they show a
remarkable ability to sense their environment. They
are attracted to materials they need and are
(5) repelled by harmful substances. Most types of
bacteria swim very erratically; short smooth runs in
relatively straight lines are followed by brief
tumbles, after which the bacteria shoot off in
random directions. This leaves researchers with the
(10) question of how such bacteria find their way to an
attractant such as food or, in the case of
photosynthetic bacteria, light, if their swimming
pattern consists only of smooth runs and tumbles,
the latter resulting in random changes in direction.

(15) One clue comes from the observation that when
a chemical attractant is added to a suspension of
such bacteria, the bacteria swim along a gradient of
the attractant, from an area where the
concentration of the attractant is weaker to an area
(20) where it is stronger. As they do so, their swimming
is characterized by a decrease in tumbling and an
increase in straight runs over relatively longer
distances. As the bacteria encounter increasing
concentrations of the attractant, their tendency to
(25) tumble is suppressed, whereas tumbling increases
whenever they move away from the attractant. The
net effect is that runs in the direction of higher
concentrations of the attractant become longer and
straighter as a result of the suppression of tumbling,
(30) whereas runs away from it are shortened by an
increased tendency of the bacteria to tumble and
change direction.

Biologists have proposed two mechanisms that
bacteria might use in detecting changes in the
(35) concentration of a chemical attractant. First, a
bacterium might compare the concentration of a
chemical at the front and back of its cell body
simultaneously. If the concentration is higher at the
front of the cell, then it knows it is moving up the
(40) concentration gradient, from an area where the
concentration is lower to an area where it is higher.
Alternatively, it might measure the concentration at
one instant and again after a brief interval, in which
case the bacterium must retain a memory of the
(45) initial concentration. Researchers reasoned that if
bacteria do compare concentrations at different
times, then when suddenly exposed to a uniformly
high concentration of an attractant, the cells would
behave as if they were swimming up a concentration
(50) gradient, with long, smooth runs and relatively few
tumbles. If, on the other hand, bacteria detect a
chemical gradient by measuring it simultaneously at
two distinct points, front and back, on the cell body,
they would not respond to the jump in
(55) concentration because the concentration of the
attractant in front and back of the cells, though
high, would be uniform. Experimental evidence
suggests that bacteria compare concentrations at
different times.

22.

Which one of the following is the most accurate expression of the main point of the passage?

Anthropologist David Mandelbaum makes a
distinction between life-passage studies and
life-history studies which emerged primarily out of
research concerning Native Americans. Life
(5) passage studies, he says,“emphasize the
requirements of society, showing how groups
socialize and enculturate their young in order to
make them into viable members of society.” Life
histories, however, “emphasize the experiences and
(10) requirements of the individual, how the person
copes with society rather than how society copes
with the stream of individuals.” Life-passage studies
bring out the general cultural characteristics and
commonalities that broadly define a culture, but are
(15) unconcerned with an individual’s choices or how the
individual perceives and responds to the demands
and expectations imposed by the constraints of his
or her culture. This distinction can clearly be seen in
the autobiographies of Native American women.

(20) For example, some early recorded
autobiographies, such as The Autobiography of a Fox
Indian Woman, a life passage recorded by
anthropologist Truman Michelson, emphasizes
prescribed roles. The narrator presents her story in
(25) a way that conforms with tribal expectations.
Michelson’s work is valuable as ethnography, as a
reflection of the day-to-day responsibilities of
Mesquakie women, yet as is often the case with
life-passage studies, it presents little of the central
(30) character’s psychological motivation. The Fox
woman’s life story focuses on her tribal education
and integration into the ways of her people, and
relates only what Michelson ultimately decided was
worth preserving. The difference between the two
(35) types of studies is often the result of the amount of
control the narrator maintains over the material;
autobiographies in which there are no recorder
editors are far more reflective of the life-history
category, for there are no outsiders shaping the
(40) story to reflect their preconceived notions of what
the general cultural patterns are.

For example, in Maria Campbell’s account of
growing up as a Canadian Metis who was influenced
strongly, and often negatively, by the non-Native
(45) American world around her, one learns a great deal
about the life of Native American women, but
Campbell’s individual story, which is told to us
directly, is always the center of her narrative.
Clearly it is important to her to communicate to the
(50) audience what her experiences as a Native
American have been. Through Campbell’s story of
her family the reader learns of the effect of poverty
and prejudice on a people. The reader becomes an
intimate of Campbell the writer, sharing her pain
(55) and celebrating her small victories. Although
Campbell’s book is written as a life history (the
dramatic moments, the frustrations, and the fears
are clearly hers), it reveals much about ethnic
relations in Canada while reflecting the period in
(60) which it was written.

23.

The term “prescribed roles” in line 24 of the passage refers to the

Anthropologist David Mandelbaum makes a
distinction between life-passage studies and
life-history studies which emerged primarily out of
research concerning Native Americans. Life
(5) passage studies, he says,“emphasize the
requirements of society, showing how groups
socialize and enculturate their young in order to
make them into viable members of society.” Life
histories, however, “emphasize the experiences and
(10) requirements of the individual, how the person
copes with society rather than how society copes
with the stream of individuals.” Life-passage studies
bring out the general cultural characteristics and
commonalities that broadly define a culture, but are
(15) unconcerned with an individual’s choices or how the
individual perceives and responds to the demands
and expectations imposed by the constraints of his
or her culture. This distinction can clearly be seen in
the autobiographies of Native American women.

(20) For example, some early recorded
autobiographies, such as The Autobiography of a Fox
Indian Woman, a life passage recorded by
anthropologist Truman Michelson, emphasizes
prescribed roles. The narrator presents her story in
(25) a way that conforms with tribal expectations.
Michelson’s work is valuable as ethnography, as a
reflection of the day-to-day responsibilities of
Mesquakie women, yet as is often the case with
life-passage studies, it presents little of the central
(30) character’s psychological motivation. The Fox
woman’s life story focuses on her tribal education
and integration into the ways of her people, and
relates only what Michelson ultimately decided was
worth preserving. The difference between the two
(35) types of studies is often the result of the amount of
control the narrator maintains over the material;
autobiographies in which there are no recorder
editors are far more reflective of the life-history
category, for there are no outsiders shaping the
(40) story to reflect their preconceived notions of what
the general cultural patterns are.

For example, in Maria Campbell’s account of
growing up as a Canadian Metis who was influenced
strongly, and often negatively, by the non-Native
(45) American world around her, one learns a great deal
about the life of Native American women, but
Campbell’s individual story, which is told to us
directly, is always the center of her narrative.
Clearly it is important to her to communicate to the
(50) audience what her experiences as a Native
American have been. Through Campbell’s story of
her family the reader learns of the effect of poverty
and prejudice on a people. The reader becomes an
intimate of Campbell the writer, sharing her pain
(55) and celebrating her small victories. Although
Campbell’s book is written as a life history (the
dramatic moments, the frustrations, and the fears
are clearly hers), it reveals much about ethnic
relations in Canada while reflecting the period in
(60) which it was written.

24.

The reference to the “psychological motivation” (line 30) of the subject of The Autobiography of a Fox Indian Woman serves primarily to

Anthropologist David Mandelbaum makes a
distinction between life-passage studies and
life-history studies which emerged primarily out of
research concerning Native Americans. Life
(5) passage studies, he says,“emphasize the
requirements of society, showing how groups
socialize and enculturate their young in order to
make them into viable members of society.” Life
histories, however, “emphasize the experiences and
(10) requirements of the individual, how the person
copes with society rather than how society copes
with the stream of individuals.” Life-passage studies
bring out the general cultural characteristics and
commonalities that broadly define a culture, but are
(15) unconcerned with an individual’s choices or how the
individual perceives and responds to the demands
and expectations imposed by the constraints of his
or her culture. This distinction can clearly be seen in
the autobiographies of Native American women.

(20) For example, some early recorded
autobiographies, such as The Autobiography of a Fox
Indian Woman, a life passage recorded by
anthropologist Truman Michelson, emphasizes
prescribed roles. The narrator presents her story in
(25) a way that conforms with tribal expectations.
Michelson’s work is valuable as ethnography, as a
reflection of the day-to-day responsibilities of
Mesquakie women, yet as is often the case with
life-passage studies, it presents little of the central
(30) character’s psychological motivation. The Fox
woman’s life story focuses on her tribal education
and integration into the ways of her people, and
relates only what Michelson ultimately decided was
worth preserving. The difference between the two
(35) types of studies is often the result of the amount of
control the narrator maintains over the material;
autobiographies in which there are no recorder
editors are far more reflective of the life-history
category, for there are no outsiders shaping the
(40) story to reflect their preconceived notions of what
the general cultural patterns are.

For example, in Maria Campbell’s account of
growing up as a Canadian Metis who was influenced
strongly, and often negatively, by the non-Native
(45) American world around her, one learns a great deal
about the life of Native American women, but
Campbell’s individual story, which is told to us
directly, is always the center of her narrative.
Clearly it is important to her to communicate to the
(50) audience what her experiences as a Native
American have been. Through Campbell’s story of
her family the reader learns of the effect of poverty
and prejudice on a people. The reader becomes an
intimate of Campbell the writer, sharing her pain
(55) and celebrating her small victories. Although
Campbell’s book is written as a life history (the
dramatic moments, the frustrations, and the fears
are clearly hers), it reveals much about ethnic
relations in Canada while reflecting the period in
(60) which it was written.

25.

Which one of the following statements about Maria Campbell can be inferred from material in the passage?

Anthropologist David Mandelbaum makes a
distinction between life-passage studies and
life-history studies which emerged primarily out of
research concerning Native Americans. Life
(5) passage studies, he says,“emphasize the
requirements of society, showing how groups
socialize and enculturate their young in order to
make them into viable members of society.” Life
histories, however, “emphasize the experiences and
(10) requirements of the individual, how the person
copes with society rather than how society copes
with the stream of individuals.” Life-passage studies
bring out the general cultural characteristics and
commonalities that broadly define a culture, but are
(15) unconcerned with an individual’s choices or how the
individual perceives and responds to the demands
and expectations imposed by the constraints of his
or her culture. This distinction can clearly be seen in
the autobiographies of Native American women.

(20) For example, some early recorded
autobiographies, such as The Autobiography of a Fox
Indian Woman, a life passage recorded by
anthropologist Truman Michelson, emphasizes
prescribed roles. The narrator presents her story in
(25) a way that conforms with tribal expectations.
Michelson’s work is valuable as ethnography, as a
reflection of the day-to-day responsibilities of
Mesquakie women, yet as is often the case with
life-passage studies, it presents little of the central
(30) character’s psychological motivation. The Fox
woman’s life story focuses on her tribal education
and integration into the ways of her people, and
relates only what Michelson ultimately decided was
worth preserving. The difference between the two
(35) types of studies is often the result of the amount of
control the narrator maintains over the material;
autobiographies in which there are no recorder
editors are far more reflective of the life-history
category, for there are no outsiders shaping the
(40) story to reflect their preconceived notions of what
the general cultural patterns are.

For example, in Maria Campbell’s account of
growing up as a Canadian Metis who was influenced
strongly, and often negatively, by the non-Native
(45) American world around her, one learns a great deal
about the life of Native American women, but
Campbell’s individual story, which is told to us
directly, is always the center of her narrative.
Clearly it is important to her to communicate to the
(50) audience what her experiences as a Native
American have been. Through Campbell’s story of
her family the reader learns of the effect of poverty
and prejudice on a people. The reader becomes an
intimate of Campbell the writer, sharing her pain
(55) and celebrating her small victories. Although
Campbell’s book is written as a life history (the
dramatic moments, the frustrations, and the fears
are clearly hers), it reveals much about ethnic
relations in Canada while reflecting the period in
(60) which it was written.

26.

According to the passage, one way in which life-history studies differ from life-passage studies is that life-history studies are

Anthropologist David Mandelbaum makes a
distinction between life-passage studies and
life-history studies which emerged primarily out of
research concerning Native Americans. Life
(5) passage studies, he says,“emphasize the
requirements of society, showing how groups
socialize and enculturate their young in order to
make them into viable members of society.” Life
histories, however, “emphasize the experiences and
(10) requirements of the individual, how the person
copes with society rather than how society copes
with the stream of individuals.” Life-passage studies
bring out the general cultural characteristics and
commonalities that broadly define a culture, but are
(15) unconcerned with an individual’s choices or how the
individual perceives and responds to the demands
and expectations imposed by the constraints of his
or her culture. This distinction can clearly be seen in
the autobiographies of Native American women.

(20) For example, some early recorded
autobiographies, such as The Autobiography of a Fox
Indian Woman, a life passage recorded by
anthropologist Truman Michelson, emphasizes
prescribed roles. The narrator presents her story in
(25) a way that conforms with tribal expectations.
Michelson’s work is valuable as ethnography, as a
reflection of the day-to-day responsibilities of
Mesquakie women, yet as is often the case with
life-passage studies, it presents little of the central
(30) character’s psychological motivation. The Fox
woman’s life story focuses on her tribal education
and integration into the ways of her people, and
relates only what Michelson ultimately decided was
worth preserving. The difference between the two
(35) types of studies is often the result of the amount of
control the narrator maintains over the material;
autobiographies in which there are no recorder
editors are far more reflective of the life-history
category, for there are no outsiders shaping the
(40) story to reflect their preconceived notions of what
the general cultural patterns are.

For example, in Maria Campbell’s account of
growing up as a Canadian Metis who was influenced
strongly, and often negatively, by the non-Native
(45) American world around her, one learns a great deal
about the life of Native American women, but
Campbell’s individual story, which is told to us
directly, is always the center of her narrative.
Clearly it is important to her to communicate to the
(50) audience what her experiences as a Native
American have been. Through Campbell’s story of
her family the reader learns of the effect of poverty
and prejudice on a people. The reader becomes an
intimate of Campbell the writer, sharing her pain
(55) and celebrating her small victories. Although
Campbell’s book is written as a life history (the
dramatic moments, the frustrations, and the fears
are clearly hers), it reveals much about ethnic
relations in Canada while reflecting the period in
(60) which it was written.

27. Which one of the following pairings best illustrates the contrast between life passages and life histories?

Anthropologist David Mandelbaum makes a
distinction between life-passage studies and
life-history studies which emerged primarily out of
research concerning Native Americans. Life
(5) passage studies, he says,“emphasize the
requirements of society, showing how groups
socialize and enculturate their young in order to
make them into viable members of society.” Life
histories, however, “emphasize the experiences and
(10) requirements of the individual, how the person
copes with society rather than how society copes
with the stream of individuals.” Life-passage studies
bring out the general cultural characteristics and
commonalities that broadly define a culture, but are
(15) unconcerned with an individual’s choices or how the
individual perceives and responds to the demands
and expectations imposed by the constraints of his
or her culture. This distinction can clearly be seen in
the autobiographies of Native American women.

(20) For example, some early recorded
autobiographies, such as The Autobiography of a Fox
Indian Woman, a life passage recorded by
anthropologist Truman Michelson, emphasizes
prescribed roles. The narrator presents her story in
(25) a way that conforms with tribal expectations.
Michelson’s work is valuable as ethnography, as a
reflection of the day-to-day responsibilities of
Mesquakie women, yet as is often the case with
life-passage studies, it presents little of the central
(30) character’s psychological motivation. The Fox
woman’s life story focuses on her tribal education
and integration into the ways of her people, and
relates only what Michelson ultimately decided was
worth preserving. The difference between the two
(35) types of studies is often the result of the amount of
control the narrator maintains over the material;
autobiographies in which there are no recorder
editors are far more reflective of the life-history
category, for there are no outsiders shaping the
(40) story to reflect their preconceived notions of what
the general cultural patterns are.

For example, in Maria Campbell’s account of
growing up as a Canadian Metis who was influenced
strongly, and often negatively, by the non-Native
(45) American world around her, one learns a great deal
about the life of Native American women, but
Campbell’s individual story, which is told to us
directly, is always the center of her narrative.
Clearly it is important to her to communicate to the
(50) audience what her experiences as a Native
American have been. Through Campbell’s story of
her family the reader learns of the effect of poverty
and prejudice on a people. The reader becomes an
intimate of Campbell the writer, sharing her pain
(55) and celebrating her small victories. Although
Campbell’s book is written as a life history (the
dramatic moments, the frustrations, and the fears
are clearly hers), it reveals much about ethnic
relations in Canada while reflecting the period in
(60) which it was written.