1.

Which one of the following most accurately states the main point of the passage?

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

2.

The passage most strongly suggests that which one of the following is true?

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

3.

Which one of the following would, if true, most strengthen the author’s position regarding the risks of deep-well injection of hazardous wastes?

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

4.

According to the passage, which one of the following is true of underground water?

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

5.

Based on the passage, which one of the following most accurately states the purpose of deep-well injection of hazardous waste?

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

6.

According to the passage, deep-well injection of hazardous wastes has become

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

7.

Based on the passage, which one of the following most accurately describes the ideal characteristics of an underground area suitable for the deep-well injection of hazardous wastes?

A major problem facing industrial societies is their
exponentially increasing production of toxic waste.
Environmental regulations and expenses for landfills and
incinerators have increased significantly in recent years.
(5) In an effort to save time and money, many industries
have turned to alternative methods of hazardous-waste
disposal, including increased use of deep-well injection.
In this method, wells are drilled into porous and
permeable rock strata that are already saturated with salt
(10) water. Liquid wastes are then injected into the rock
strata. Most of these wells are drilled to a depth of at
least 300 meters—the minimum depth that generally puts
the injected waste at a safe distance below any aquifer, in
this case a rock stratum containing drinkable water. Such
(15) wells are rarely deeper than 1,800 meters, because below
this depth it is more cost-effective to consider an
alternative method of disposal. Deep-well injection,
which has been used to some extent since the 1930s, has
become a matter of controversy as growing numbers of
(20) communities come to rely on underground sources of
drinking water. The controversy arises because there are
three serious problems with this method of waste
disposal.

Under the best conditions, wastes are injected into
(25) rock strata saturated with salt water and separated by
impermeable rock strata from aquifers containing
drinkable water. However, injection wells may leak,
allowing significant amounts of noxious chemicals to
mix with supplies of drinking water. In other cases,
(30) mistakes by personnel working on the wells may lead to
the pollution of aquifers. In one such case, workers
installing a 500-meter-deep well left a gap along
approximately 30 meters of its steel casing. This allowed
waste to escape at depth of only 200 meters, threatening
(35) a regional aquifer supplying water to 100,000 people.
Because such accidents take place deep within the earth,
people may be exposed to dangerous levels of waste
materials for long periods of time before the problem is
even discovered.

(40) The third problem associated with deep-well
injection arises from the fact that it is nearly impossible
to predict how the injected wastes will be acted on by the
geological features of the injection area. Unlike surface
water, the water in underground rock strata does not flow
(45) entirely under the influence of gravity. Moving along
subterranean pressure gradients, it can flow in any
direction and, in some cases, can be transported
thousands of meters per year through geologic faults,
porous rock, or other geologic formations.
(50) The significant uncertainty about where
injected wastes will flow, along with the
possibilities of mechanical failure and human
error, makes deep-well injection a risky means of
managing hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, as
(55) societies produce more toxic waste, industry will
rely increasingly upon this relatively cheap,
efficient means of disposal.

8.

The passage provides the most support for inferring that conventional society as portrayed in picaresque novels perceives the picaro as representing a dangerous, disruptive freedom for which one of the following reasons?

Native American stories often feature a character
called the trickster, a comic figure who has both mortal
weaknesses and supernatural powers. Recently, the term
“trickster” has also appeared in criticism of sixteenth-
(5) and seventeenth-century European literature, particularly
in reference to the picaresque novel and its central
character, the picaro (Spanish for “rogue”): both the
picaro and the trickster are heroes of episodic adventures,
and both live on the peripheries of society and are
(10) morally flawed.

Yet closer examination reveals that applying the
term “trickster” to both characters obscures essential
differences between them. The picaro—typically a male
character—operates primarily as an agent of satire. Most
(15) commonly, the picaro’s adventures begin when he
spontaneously yields to his own roguish, though
innocent, impulses. The picaro indulges in vices and
follies with relish and freedom, much to the outrage of
other members of society, who often secretly indulge in
(20) similar pastimes out of a habitual compulsion. Thus the
picaro’s authenticity serves as a foil to the perceived
hypocrisy of conventional society. To such a society, the
picaro can represent a dangerous, disruptive freedom,
and it reacts by marginalizing him. It is in that distance—
(25) between the ostensibly disreputable freedom of the
picaro and the hypocrisy of the safely ensconced social
being—that the satire occurs.

But the trickster, usually an animal acting as a
human agent, does not serve a satiric function. For while
(30) the picaresque novel takes place in and satirizes human
society, the trickster operates in the ahistorical world of
myth; where the targets of the picaresque novel are the
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies of a historical human
society, trickster stories seek, using the trickster’s
(35) negative example, to instruct listeners about moral
behavior of individuals. In fact, whatever flaws the
trickster reveals are thoroughly the trickster’s own. They
are not a foil to a corrupt society; they are instead
essential to who the trickster is. The trickster is a comic
(40) figure precisely because of these somewhat irrational,
compulsive, and foolish—in short, mortal—actions.
Similarly, the trickster is a socially peripheral character
not by being forced to the periphery by a hypocritical
society, but rather because the trickster’s thoroughly
(45) flawed character makes the trickster fundamentally
antisocial, even anarchic, all the while helping listeners
to avoid these flaws.

It is this combination of mythic setting and mortal
weakness that determines the particular targets of the
(50) trickster’s comic high jinks: the eternal and unchanging
foibles of mortal beings. In one story, for example, a
coyote trickster falls in love with a star. The trickster is
quite tenacious and human, even though the object of
desire is beyond reasonable mortal possibility. In the end
(55) the star takes the trickster up into the sky, only to let the
trickster fall back to Earth; the story’s listeners realize
that the trickster has gotten a comeuppance for reaching
beyond proper limits, but all the while they recognize in
themselves the trickster’s extravagant hopes.

9.

Based on the author’s view in the passage, applying the term “trickster” to the character of the picaro is most similar to which one of the following?

Native American stories often feature a character
called the trickster, a comic figure who has both mortal
weaknesses and supernatural powers. Recently, the term
“trickster” has also appeared in criticism of sixteenth-
(5) and seventeenth-century European literature, particularly
in reference to the picaresque novel and its central
character, the picaro (Spanish for “rogue”): both the
picaro and the trickster are heroes of episodic adventures,
and both live on the peripheries of society and are
(10) morally flawed.

Yet closer examination reveals that applying the
term “trickster” to both characters obscures essential
differences between them. The picaro—typically a male
character—operates primarily as an agent of satire. Most
(15) commonly, the picaro’s adventures begin when he
spontaneously yields to his own roguish, though
innocent, impulses. The picaro indulges in vices and
follies with relish and freedom, much to the outrage of
other members of society, who often secretly indulge in
(20) similar pastimes out of a habitual compulsion. Thus the
picaro’s authenticity serves as a foil to the perceived
hypocrisy of conventional society. To such a society, the
picaro can represent a dangerous, disruptive freedom,
and it reacts by marginalizing him. It is in that distance—
(25) between the ostensibly disreputable freedom of the
picaro and the hypocrisy of the safely ensconced social
being—that the satire occurs.

But the trickster, usually an animal acting as a
human agent, does not serve a satiric function. For while
(30) the picaresque novel takes place in and satirizes human
society, the trickster operates in the ahistorical world of
myth; where the targets of the picaresque novel are the
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies of a historical human
society, trickster stories seek, using the trickster’s
(35) negative example, to instruct listeners about moral
behavior of individuals. In fact, whatever flaws the
trickster reveals are thoroughly the trickster’s own. They
are not a foil to a corrupt society; they are instead
essential to who the trickster is. The trickster is a comic
(40) figure precisely because of these somewhat irrational,
compulsive, and foolish—in short, mortal—actions.
Similarly, the trickster is a socially peripheral character
not by being forced to the periphery by a hypocritical
society, but rather because the trickster’s thoroughly
(45) flawed character makes the trickster fundamentally
antisocial, even anarchic, all the while helping listeners
to avoid these flaws.

It is this combination of mythic setting and mortal
weakness that determines the particular targets of the
(50) trickster’s comic high jinks: the eternal and unchanging
foibles of mortal beings. In one story, for example, a
coyote trickster falls in love with a star. The trickster is
quite tenacious and human, even though the object of
desire is beyond reasonable mortal possibility. In the end
(55) the star takes the trickster up into the sky, only to let the
trickster fall back to Earth; the story’s listeners realize
that the trickster has gotten a comeuppance for reaching
beyond proper limits, but all the while they recognize in
themselves the trickster’s extravagant hopes.

10.

The author of the passage states that the flaws of the trickster are not a foil to a corrupt society (middle of the third paragraph) primarily in order to

Native American stories often feature a character
called the trickster, a comic figure who has both mortal
weaknesses and supernatural powers. Recently, the term
“trickster” has also appeared in criticism of sixteenth-
(5) and seventeenth-century European literature, particularly
in reference to the picaresque novel and its central
character, the picaro (Spanish for “rogue”): both the
picaro and the trickster are heroes of episodic adventures,
and both live on the peripheries of society and are
(10) morally flawed.

Yet closer examination reveals that applying the
term “trickster” to both characters obscures essential
differences between them. The picaro—typically a male
character—operates primarily as an agent of satire. Most
(15) commonly, the picaro’s adventures begin when he
spontaneously yields to his own roguish, though
innocent, impulses. The picaro indulges in vices and
follies with relish and freedom, much to the outrage of
other members of society, who often secretly indulge in
(20) similar pastimes out of a habitual compulsion. Thus the
picaro’s authenticity serves as a foil to the perceived
hypocrisy of conventional society. To such a society, the
picaro can represent a dangerous, disruptive freedom,
and it reacts by marginalizing him. It is in that distance—
(25) between the ostensibly disreputable freedom of the
picaro and the hypocrisy of the safely ensconced social
being—that the satire occurs.

But the trickster, usually an animal acting as a
human agent, does not serve a satiric function. For while
(30) the picaresque novel takes place in and satirizes human
society, the trickster operates in the ahistorical world of
myth; where the targets of the picaresque novel are the
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies of a historical human
society, trickster stories seek, using the trickster’s
(35) negative example, to instruct listeners about moral
behavior of individuals. In fact, whatever flaws the
trickster reveals are thoroughly the trickster’s own. They
are not a foil to a corrupt society; they are instead
essential to who the trickster is. The trickster is a comic
(40) figure precisely because of these somewhat irrational,
compulsive, and foolish—in short, mortal—actions.
Similarly, the trickster is a socially peripheral character
not by being forced to the periphery by a hypocritical
society, but rather because the trickster’s thoroughly
(45) flawed character makes the trickster fundamentally
antisocial, even anarchic, all the while helping listeners
to avoid these flaws.

It is this combination of mythic setting and mortal
weakness that determines the particular targets of the
(50) trickster’s comic high jinks: the eternal and unchanging
foibles of mortal beings. In one story, for example, a
coyote trickster falls in love with a star. The trickster is
quite tenacious and human, even though the object of
desire is beyond reasonable mortal possibility. In the end
(55) the star takes the trickster up into the sky, only to let the
trickster fall back to Earth; the story’s listeners realize
that the trickster has gotten a comeuppance for reaching
beyond proper limits, but all the while they recognize in
themselves the trickster’s extravagant hopes.

11.

Based on the passage, the author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about the literary criticism mentioned in the second sentence of the first paragraph?

Native American stories often feature a character
called the trickster, a comic figure who has both mortal
weaknesses and supernatural powers. Recently, the term
“trickster” has also appeared in criticism of sixteenth-
(5) and seventeenth-century European literature, particularly
in reference to the picaresque novel and its central
character, the picaro (Spanish for “rogue”): both the
picaro and the trickster are heroes of episodic adventures,
and both live on the peripheries of society and are
(10) morally flawed.

Yet closer examination reveals that applying the
term “trickster” to both characters obscures essential
differences between them. The picaro—typically a male
character—operates primarily as an agent of satire. Most
(15) commonly, the picaro’s adventures begin when he
spontaneously yields to his own roguish, though
innocent, impulses. The picaro indulges in vices and
follies with relish and freedom, much to the outrage of
other members of society, who often secretly indulge in
(20) similar pastimes out of a habitual compulsion. Thus the
picaro’s authenticity serves as a foil to the perceived
hypocrisy of conventional society. To such a society, the
picaro can represent a dangerous, disruptive freedom,
and it reacts by marginalizing him. It is in that distance—
(25) between the ostensibly disreputable freedom of the
picaro and the hypocrisy of the safely ensconced social
being—that the satire occurs.

But the trickster, usually an animal acting as a
human agent, does not serve a satiric function. For while
(30) the picaresque novel takes place in and satirizes human
society, the trickster operates in the ahistorical world of
myth; where the targets of the picaresque novel are the
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies of a historical human
society, trickster stories seek, using the trickster’s
(35) negative example, to instruct listeners about moral
behavior of individuals. In fact, whatever flaws the
trickster reveals are thoroughly the trickster’s own. They
are not a foil to a corrupt society; they are instead
essential to who the trickster is. The trickster is a comic
(40) figure precisely because of these somewhat irrational,
compulsive, and foolish—in short, mortal—actions.
Similarly, the trickster is a socially peripheral character
not by being forced to the periphery by a hypocritical
society, but rather because the trickster’s thoroughly
(45) flawed character makes the trickster fundamentally
antisocial, even anarchic, all the while helping listeners
to avoid these flaws.

It is this combination of mythic setting and mortal
weakness that determines the particular targets of the
(50) trickster’s comic high jinks: the eternal and unchanging
foibles of mortal beings. In one story, for example, a
coyote trickster falls in love with a star. The trickster is
quite tenacious and human, even though the object of
desire is beyond reasonable mortal possibility. In the end
(55) the star takes the trickster up into the sky, only to let the
trickster fall back to Earth; the story’s listeners realize
that the trickster has gotten a comeuppance for reaching
beyond proper limits, but all the while they recognize in
themselves the trickster’s extravagant hopes.

12.

In the context of the passage, which one of the following most accurately captures the meaning of the term “authenticity” in the middle of the second paragraph?

Native American stories often feature a character
called the trickster, a comic figure who has both mortal
weaknesses and supernatural powers. Recently, the term
“trickster” has also appeared in criticism of sixteenth-
(5) and seventeenth-century European literature, particularly
in reference to the picaresque novel and its central
character, the picaro (Spanish for “rogue”): both the
picaro and the trickster are heroes of episodic adventures,
and both live on the peripheries of society and are
(10) morally flawed.

Yet closer examination reveals that applying the
term “trickster” to both characters obscures essential
differences between them. The picaro—typically a male
character—operates primarily as an agent of satire. Most
(15) commonly, the picaro’s adventures begin when he
spontaneously yields to his own roguish, though
innocent, impulses. The picaro indulges in vices and
follies with relish and freedom, much to the outrage of
other members of society, who often secretly indulge in
(20) similar pastimes out of a habitual compulsion. Thus the
picaro’s authenticity serves as a foil to the perceived
hypocrisy of conventional society. To such a society, the
picaro can represent a dangerous, disruptive freedom,
and it reacts by marginalizing him. It is in that distance—
(25) between the ostensibly disreputable freedom of the
picaro and the hypocrisy of the safely ensconced social
being—that the satire occurs.

But the trickster, usually an animal acting as a
human agent, does not serve a satiric function. For while
(30) the picaresque novel takes place in and satirizes human
society, the trickster operates in the ahistorical world of
myth; where the targets of the picaresque novel are the
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies of a historical human
society, trickster stories seek, using the trickster’s
(35) negative example, to instruct listeners about moral
behavior of individuals. In fact, whatever flaws the
trickster reveals are thoroughly the trickster’s own. They
are not a foil to a corrupt society; they are instead
essential to who the trickster is. The trickster is a comic
(40) figure precisely because of these somewhat irrational,
compulsive, and foolish—in short, mortal—actions.
Similarly, the trickster is a socially peripheral character
not by being forced to the periphery by a hypocritical
society, but rather because the trickster’s thoroughly
(45) flawed character makes the trickster fundamentally
antisocial, even anarchic, all the while helping listeners
to avoid these flaws.

It is this combination of mythic setting and mortal
weakness that determines the particular targets of the
(50) trickster’s comic high jinks: the eternal and unchanging
foibles of mortal beings. In one story, for example, a
coyote trickster falls in love with a star. The trickster is
quite tenacious and human, even though the object of
desire is beyond reasonable mortal possibility. In the end
(55) the star takes the trickster up into the sky, only to let the
trickster fall back to Earth; the story’s listeners realize
that the trickster has gotten a comeuppance for reaching
beyond proper limits, but all the while they recognize in
themselves the trickster’s extravagant hopes.

13.

The author refers to the story concerning the coyote trickster and the star for each of the following reasons EXCEPT:

Native American stories often feature a character
called the trickster, a comic figure who has both mortal
weaknesses and supernatural powers. Recently, the term
“trickster” has also appeared in criticism of sixteenth-
(5) and seventeenth-century European literature, particularly
in reference to the picaresque novel and its central
character, the picaro (Spanish for “rogue”): both the
picaro and the trickster are heroes of episodic adventures,
and both live on the peripheries of society and are
(10) morally flawed.

Yet closer examination reveals that applying the
term “trickster” to both characters obscures essential
differences between them. The picaro—typically a male
character—operates primarily as an agent of satire. Most
(15) commonly, the picaro’s adventures begin when he
spontaneously yields to his own roguish, though
innocent, impulses. The picaro indulges in vices and
follies with relish and freedom, much to the outrage of
other members of society, who often secretly indulge in
(20) similar pastimes out of a habitual compulsion. Thus the
picaro’s authenticity serves as a foil to the perceived
hypocrisy of conventional society. To such a society, the
picaro can represent a dangerous, disruptive freedom,
and it reacts by marginalizing him. It is in that distance—
(25) between the ostensibly disreputable freedom of the
picaro and the hypocrisy of the safely ensconced social
being—that the satire occurs.

But the trickster, usually an animal acting as a
human agent, does not serve a satiric function. For while
(30) the picaresque novel takes place in and satirizes human
society, the trickster operates in the ahistorical world of
myth; where the targets of the picaresque novel are the
idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies of a historical human
society, trickster stories seek, using the trickster’s
(35) negative example, to instruct listeners about moral
behavior of individuals. In fact, whatever flaws the
trickster reveals are thoroughly the trickster’s own. They
are not a foil to a corrupt society; they are instead
essential to who the trickster is. The trickster is a comic
(40) figure precisely because of these somewhat irrational,
compulsive, and foolish—in short, mortal—actions.
Similarly, the trickster is a socially peripheral character
not by being forced to the periphery by a hypocritical
society, but rather because the trickster’s thoroughly
(45) flawed character makes the trickster fundamentally
antisocial, even anarchic, all the while helping listeners
to avoid these flaws.

It is this combination of mythic setting and mortal
weakness that determines the particular targets of the
(50) trickster’s comic high jinks: the eternal and unchanging
foibles of mortal beings. In one story, for example, a
coyote trickster falls in love with a star. The trickster is
quite tenacious and human, even though the object of
desire is beyond reasonable mortal possibility. In the end
(55) the star takes the trickster up into the sky, only to let the
trickster fall back to Earth; the story’s listeners realize
that the trickster has gotten a comeuppance for reaching
beyond proper limits, but all the while they recognize in
themselves the trickster’s extravagant hopes.

14.

Both passages are concerned with answering which one of the following questions?

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

15.

The authors of the two passages would be most likely to agree that

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

16.

Which one of the following is a central purpose common to both passages?

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

17.

By using the phrase “political fervor” (first sentence of the second paragraph of passage A), the author of passage A suggests that Rosenthal exhibits

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

18.

It can be inferred that the author of passage B regards the historical approach of the author of passage A as

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

19.

Passage A asserts that the inevitable answer to the question raised in Rosenthal’s book is that

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

20.

Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the relationship between the two passages?

Passage A

In her 1996 history of plagiarism in English
Renaissance drama, Laura J. Rosenthal tells us that her
purpose is to “question differences between plagiarism,
(5) imitation, adaptation, repetition, and originality.” But
such rhetorical questioning invariably leads to the
required postmodern answer: that there is no difference
between these things—other than that those in power use
the opprobrious term “plagiarism” when the work in
(10) question emanates from those whom they dislike.

Though the book is animated by a political fervor
that is clearly moral, the author writes as if a political
approach has to extirpate all moral considerations from
any discussion of plagiarism. What in moral terms is a
(15) matter of honesty or dishonesty—plagiarism being
dishonest—is instead reduced to “the cultural location of
the text and the position of the author.”

The consequence of a historical approach that seeks
to “delegitimize” the distinction between imitation and
(20) plagiarism is that it demeans and degrades moral thought.
That no moral standard is universal does not of itself
entail that moral standards are nothing but expressions of
power. Moral conventions, though not universal, may be
valuable, indispensable, worthy of respect. The
(25) extirpation of moral considerations from political
histories such as this one is a sad loss to political history.

Passage B

The idea of plagiarism, like all ideas, has a history.
To earlier generations it had semantic inflections and
(30) resonances different from those we recognize today. The
varied impulses behind these varying views—which have
themselves evolved in response to commercial
circumstances, new theories of artistic creation, and
developments in copyright law—have repeatedly
(35) complicated judgments of plagiarism. Despite an abiding
sense that plagiarism is morally wrong, there has been
much fluidity in the way the charge has been applied, and
virtually identical acts of illicit appropriation have been
sometimes denounced, sometimes excused, and
(40) sometimes praised.

Christopher Ricks is suspicious of historical
approaches to ethical issues; to him, emphasis on change
across generations produces an extenuating moral
relativism that shields the evil of plagiarism from its due
(45) obloquy. But there are historical approaches, and there
are historical approaches.

Ricks is rightly dismissive of the postmodern
reduction of moral standards to expressions of power.
And it is also true that there has been some shoddy
(50) scholarship that anachronistically projects modern-day
ideologies having to do with gender, race, or class onto
historically remote controversies. Yet bad history is no
argument against history itself. To reconstruct the
attitudes of the past is not necessarily to vindicate
(55) them. It is merely to acknowledge that whatever
we might think is the correct way of apprehending
plagiarism—and there is hardly a consensus on
the matter even today—our predecessors may not,
and often did not, share our perspectives.

21.

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.

22.

Which one of the following most accurately describes the author’s purpose in saying that corporations often bury responsibility within complex hierarchies?

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.

23.

It can be inferred from the passage that legal theorists who recommend the use of civil rather than criminal sanctions to combat corporate wrongdoing believe that

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.

24.

Which one of the following does the author of the passage assert to be true?

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.

25.

It can be inferred from the passage that those who support the criminal prosecution of individuals within corporations rather than the criminal prosecution of corporations believe that

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.

26. Suppose a corporation has for decades polluted a river on which a major city is located with toxic waste known to increase the incidence of certain forms of cancer.

Which one of the following scenarios would most closely conform to the author’s views regarding how corporate wrongdoing is most effectively addressed?

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.

27.

The author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

The use of criminal sanctions against corporations
is well established, but the practice has recently come
under fire from legal theorists who maintain that
corporations should be held civilly rather than criminally
(5) liable for wrongdoing. Civil liability, these theorists
argue, shares important features with criminal liability:
both impose punishment on a company, both aim at
deterrence, and both degrade a company’s reputation.
Yet, they claim, civil liability is better able to determine
(10) appropriate levels of damages. Furthermore, because
criminal liability causes a greater loss of reputation, its
overall cost to corporations is far higher than that of civil
liability; this additional cost is borne by society at large
in the form of higher product prices. Finally, civil
(15) liability is also more cost-effective from the point of
view of the government: the greater procedural
protections of criminal law make deterrence through
criminal prosecution extremely expensive.

Even if it is less economical, however, criminal
(20) liability is a much stronger deterrent. The considerable
enforcement powers involved, including the ability to
detain and question corporate officials, are themselves
significant deterrents. Furthermore, the fact that private
civil litigation requires an identifiable victim with the
(25) necessary resources to commence litigation weakens its
deterrent impact. Most importantly, the main function of
criminal law is to censure wrongdoing and to emphasize
that society forcefully rejects such conduct. Civil liability
is ill suited for this purpose.

(30) Other legal theorists who do not object to criminal
sanctions per se argue that individuals within
corporations, rather than corporations themselves, are the
appropriate target of criminal prosecution in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. They maintain that
(35) individuals within corporations are more responsive to
deterrence because they generally fear prosecution and
the loss of employment that can result from it.
Additionally, they say, punishment of a corporation, in
the form of a fine, essentially punishes shareholders,
(40) creditors, employees who may be laid off, and ultimately
the public, which is forced to absorb higher prices.

However, this approach is also misguided.
Corporations often bury responsibility within complex
hierarchies, with the result that no individual responsible
(45) for corporate misdeeds can be identified. Another
problem is that under this approach, a corporation will
often find it cheaper to designate and compensate an
internal scapegoat to face prosecution than to refrain
from wrongdoing. The most effective way to ensure that
(50) corporations improve their practices is to hold
corporations themselves criminally liable for their
conduct. Indeed, criminal liability works on shareholders
as well as corporate officers and employees: because
criminal punishment of corporations decreases their
(55) wealth, it can motivate shareholders to push for better
corporate practices. Arguments that shareholders and
employees need economic protection are outweighed by
the greater societal interest in ensuring the safety of
employees, the public, and the environment.